Theodicy Argument - Conversation with Rafie Zuhaili, Theology student

Why is evil necessary when God has absolute power?*

The truth is the existence of evil does not in any way or by any means diminish or denigrate God's omnipotence (divine power). Here's why:

"In the Imam's (Ali ibn Abi Talib's) spiritual vision of tawhid, one perceives — according to one's capacity — an ultimate reality which not only 'has no second' but which also has no moral 'opposite.' For the goodness that is proper to God is not the moral opposite of evil, rather, it is situated on a different plane altogether, that of al-Haqq, the absolutely Real, the only 'opposite' to which is unreality or nothingness. Thus, while goodness is at one with the pure positivity of the Absolute, evil derives solely from the negative capacity to negate the Real, the Good.

In other words, goodness is identified in its essence with the Creator, while evil is a modality of the created. This is strongly implied in the Qur'anic verse which tells the believer to seek refuge in God 'from the evil of that which He created' (113:2). This verse if often mistranslated as 'from the evil which He created,' which is wrong both theologically and lexically. The expression 'min sharri ma khalaqa' refers clearly to the evil deriving from creation and not the creation as such.

In theological terms, God creates morally free agents and it is they who are the authors of the evil in creation. God may be said to 'create' all actions, only in the metaphysical sense that He is the source of all being, and thus of all modalities within being, and actions constitute one such modality; however, God cannot be said to have created evil as such, only the conditions within which evil emerges. Evil is thus the negation of the Good, which is at one with the Real; as such, evil has no ultimate ontological principle." (Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imam Ali, by Reza Shah-Kazemi).

Consider light and darkness: Light exists in essence, and thus light has an ontological principle, whereas darkness doesn't exist in essence, and thus darkness has no ontological principle. To put it simply, while light is light, darkness is not darkness, for darkness is just a negation (absence) of light. Similarly, while good is good, evil is not evil, for evil is simply a negation (absence) of good.

I apologise in advance for being academic and particular in my humble attempt at an explanation. I'm just sharing the concern of Jerome of Stridonium, the most learned of the Latin Fathers, who cautions that "heresy arises from words wrongly used." Hope that helps. :)

*Are you using Augustine of Hippo's argument? I am quite interested with the fact that Ibn Rushd works were much appreciated in Europe that they triggered the Renaissance.

*It's interesting that you brought up the Church Father, Augustine of Hippo, because before his conversion to Christianity he was actually a Manichean, and one of the reasons why he was attracted to Manicheism was because it did not make God responsible for evil. Your suggestion that God-given free will is the cause of evil is indeed an argument that Augustine was familiar with (from his encounters with Neoplatonic philosophy) and believed in. But while that idea was traditionally attributed to Augustine's, it was actually inspired by another Church Father, Ambrose of Milan, whose sermons taught that the choices we make are not predestined simply because we have free will.

*ADDENDUM I:Divine self-restraint is a concept propounded by the Mu'tazila (i.e. the Rationalists) in order to ground their argument that while omnipotent, God would never do anything unjust towards His creations. The Mu'tazila are well-known for their emphatic belief in divine justice and their unique interpretation thereof, so much so that they call themselves "the People of Divine Unity and Justice" (Ahlul Tawhid wal-Adl). Consequently, divine self-restraint in Mu'tazili discourse emphasises on just that — divine justice.

Example: Could and would God punish the good?

The Rationalists: God could punish the good (i.e. God is omnipotent) but He would not (i.e. God is just; He has self-restraint).

The Traditionalists: God could punish the good (i.e. God is omnipotent) and He would if He wanted to (i.e. God is omnipotent).

Note: Ali ibn Abi Talib once said, "ashhadu annahu adl" — I testify that God is justice and He acts justly.

*ADDENDUM II:The reason why they have been a plethora of spiritual visions since time immemorial is because people always seek to know the Unknowable. In attempting to explain the Divine, classical Muslims, for instance, were split into two major groups: the Traditionalists and the Rationalists. Realising very well that the Divine is unknowable and thus inexplicable, the former promulgated the doctrine of bila kayfa (i.e. without knowing how, without asking why). The latter, on the other hand, utilised Greek philosophy in their admittedly valiant but devoutly sincere efforts to comprehend the Divine. My line of reasoning is that of the latter's. My conclusion is therefore that which is arrived at through the combination of both faith and reason, and like other spiritual visions of the Divine, it is by no means perfect. But then again, nothing that is known and knowable to mankind ever is. Does it thus not make sense that the Unknown, the Unknowable is the One Perfection that we all seek but never quite grasp? Well, it makes sense to me, but if it doesn't do it for you, then just go with whatever that does. After all, no matter who says what, the One Perfection does say "there shall be no compulsion in religion." I don't know about you, but I think He means just that.

Peace.*